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Abstract 
 
We experimentally investigate behavior and beliefs in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Each 
subject had to choose an action as first-mover and a conditional action as second-mover. All 
subjects also had to state their beliefs about others’ second-mover choices. We find that 
subjects’ beliefs about others’ choices are fairly accurate on average. Using the elicited beliefs, 
we compare the explanatory power of a few current models of social and moral preferences. The 
data show clear differences in explanatory power between the preference models, both without 
and with control for the number of free parameters. The best-performing models explain about 
80% of observed behavior. We use the estimated preference parameters to identify biases in 
subjects’ expectations. We find a consensus bias (whereby subjects believe others behave like 
themselves) and a certain optimism (whereby subjects overestimate probabilities for favorable 
outcomes), the former being about twice as strong as the second. 
JEL-Codes: C720, C900, D030, D840. 
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1 Introduction
Alternative specifications of social preferences have been discussed and analyzed in the behavi-
oral and experimental economics literature. Recently, a lively debate has emerged about how
potential belief biases influence behavior, in particular concerning conditional cooperation in
sequential prisoners’ dilemmas and trust games. As noted by Altmann et al. (2008), there is
a tendency for within-subject positive correlation between first-mover cooperation and second-
mover conditional cooperation. That paper points out that if beliefs about others’ behavior had
been correct, there would instead be a negative correlation according to established preference
models (such as the inequity aversion model of Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). Follow-up papers have
noted a more general tendency for inconsistency between within-subject behavioral correlations
and the predictions of various preference models (see e.g. Blanco et al. 2011). There are also
studies that have started to analyze belief biases as potential explanations for anomalous be-
havioral correlations. Gächter et al. (2012) and Blanco et al. (2014) suggest a role both for
optimism (Weinstein, 1980) and for a consensus eﬀect (Ross et al. 1977), respectively.1
We here report results from a simple laboratory experiment based on a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma (one player moves first and the other player observes the first move and then makes
a move). Subjects were randomly and anonymously matched in pairs. Each subject had to
choose an action, C or D, both as first-mover and as second-mover after each of the first mover’s
possible two actions. All subjects also had to state their beliefs about others’ second-mover
choices. After this, we randomly assigned the roles as first and second mover within each pair,
and the subjects’ chosen actions were implemented and payoﬀs paid. Subjects were also paid
according to the accuracy of their beliefs about other’s choices.
Our main contribution is to use the subjects’ stated beliefs about each others’ behavior in
a comparison of the explanatory power of five current models of social preferences. In all five
models we assume risk neutrality. Our simplest model, Homo economicus —maximization of
own expected payoﬀ—explains about 28% of our observations. Unconditional Altruism, where a
positive weight is placed on the other party’s payoﬀ, can explain about 44% of the observations.
The Fehr-Schmidt (1999) Inequity aversion model, in which negative weights are given to payoﬀ
diﬀerences between the two parties (with a bigger weight when the diﬀerence is to the subject’s
disadvantage) can explain about 60% of the observations. The fourth model was a version of
the Charness and Rabin (2002) model of a concern for social eﬃciency and inequity conditioned
upon the two parties’ relative outcomes (just as the Inequity aversion model). The (slightly
simplified) version tested here, which we call the Social welfare model, explains about 82%
of the observations. These four models all view decision makers as only concerned about the
distribution of payoﬀs, and not how payoﬀ distributions come about. Models of the latter kind
1For studies of the role of optimism in economics, see Hey (1984), Puri and Robinson (2007), Bellemare et al.
(2008), Gächter et al. (2012), Muren (2012), Spinnewijn (2015), and Dillenberger et al. (2016).
2
include reciprocity models, such as the more complex version of Charness and Rabin (2002), as
well as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fishbacher (2006), and Cox et al. (2008).
Due to their complexity, our data is insuﬃcient to identify the relevant parameters of those
models.2
In our “horse-race” there is a fifth and final model that is similar to the latter in that it is
not purely consequentialistic, but this one is identifiable: the Homo moralis model of Alger and
Weibull (2013), which attaches a positive weight to a version of Kant’s categorical imperative,
explains about 83% of the observations.3 Hence, the Social welfare and Homo moralis models
share the “first prize” in this horse-race between motivational models. We note, however, that
while the Social welfare model has two free parameters, the Homo moralis model has only one.
Our second contribution is to shed light on subjective beliefs about others’ behavior. We find
that on average subjects’ beliefs are fairly accurate. Yet, the stated beliefs diﬀer in a consistent
manner. The diﬀerences can be explained in terms of a consensus bias (belief that others act
like oneself) and optimism (belief that more favorable outcomes are more likely). Indeed, our
data suggests that the stated subjective beliefs about second-mover cooperation rates can be
explained as a combination of three terms: the true rate (about 52% weight), a consensus
bias (about 33%), and optimism (15%). In summary, the paper sheds light on the two main
motivational factors behind strategic behavior; beliefs and preferences.
The rest of the material is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design,
Section 3 reports observations about average behaviors and beliefs, Section 4 specifies the dif-
ferent preference models and analyzes their predictions, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were given written instructions containing all
the details of the experiment. To ensure the understanding of the experimental procedures all
subjects had to answer several control questions. The experiment did not start until all subjects
had answered all questions correctly. In addition, key aspects of the experiment were orally
summarized. Subjects interacted in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game form as is illustrated in Figure
1 below.
The elicitation of subjects’ preferences proceeded as follows. All subjects were randomly
and anonymously matched into pairs, i.e., no subject knew the identity of her opponent. Each
subject was asked to make a second mover choice between C and D, both for the case when
the other player–the first mover–plays C and D. In addition, each subject had to make an
2The Levine (1998) model of conditional altruism and spite is diﬃcult to identify with our data on similar
grounds, and thus is not analyzed in this paper.
3Kant (1785): “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should
become a universal law.”
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unconditional choice between C and D as first mover. In order to rule out possible sequencing
eﬀects, half of the subjects made their first-mover choice first and their second-mover choices
second, while the other half made their second-mover choices first.
Figure 1: A sequential prisoners’ dilemma.
When the subjects had made their choices, each subject was asked to state his or her belief
about the conditional choices of the opponent. More precisely, we asked each subject for his or
her estimate of the probability that the second mover will cooperate if he or she as first mover
cooperates or defects, respectively. The quadratic scoring rule was used to make the elicitation
of beliefs incentive compatible.4
After both subjects in a pair had made their choices and stated their beliefs, in each session
one subject threw a die to determine for whom of the subjects the unconditional decision and
for whom the conditional decision was payoﬀ relevant. Finally, subjects were informed about
their and their opponent’s payoﬀ relevant decision and the resulting payoﬀ they earned in the
experiment.
In total 96 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were students either at
the University of Zürich or the ETH Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich. The
experimental sessions were run in 2003. No subject participated in more than one session. All
decisions had monetary consequences, where 10 payoﬀ units represented 3 Swiss Francs (1 CHF
= 0.59 USD at the time of the experiment). On average subjects received 27.70 Swiss Francs,
including a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs. All decisions were made on a computer screen. We
used the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4Notice that subjects’ inputs to the belief questions can take any value between 0 and 100 indicating the
likelihood, in percentage terms, that the opponent chooses 
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3 Average behaviors and average beliefs
We use the second-mover choices to categorize the participants into four behavior classes as fol-
lows: unconditional cooperators, who cooperate irrespective of the first-mover choice, conditional
cooperators, who reciprocate the choice of the first-mover, mismatchers, who do the opposite of
the first mover, and unconditional defectors, who defect irrespective of the first-mover’s choice.
We find 9, 36, 6, and 45 participants in each of these classes. In percentages, this amounts
to population shares of approximately 9%, 38%, 6%, and 47%, see Table 1 below, where CC
indicates unconditional cooperation, CD conditional cooperation, DC mismatching, and DD
unconditional defection.
TABLE 1: Subjects’ first-mover choices (rows) and second-mover choices (columns).
CC CD DC DD
C 7 33 1 13 56%
D 2 3 5 32 44%
9% 38% 6% 47%
We then study the average first-mover behavior within each of these four behavior classes,
and find important diﬀerences. Whereas only 29% of the unconditional defectors cooperate as
first movers, as many as 92% of the conditional cooperators do. Of the two less frequent behavior
classes, 78% of the unconditional cooperators cooperate as first movers, while only 17% of the
mismatchers do so. Thus, in total 56% of all participants cooperate as first movers.
We also study the participants’ average beliefs about the second-mover cooperation. We find
that participants on average believe that roughly 49% of the second-movers will cooperate if the
first-mover cooperates and that roughly 20% will cooperate if the first-mover defects. According
to our data, the true rates are 47% and 16%. There is thus some upward bias in participants’
expectations about other participant’s second-mover cooperation rates. There are important
diﬀerences in beliefs across the four behavior classes, however (ordered according to prevalence
in our subject pool):
The 45 unconditional defectors (playing DD) expect on average 35% cooperation rate
conditional on cooperation, and 21% cooperation rate conditional on defection,
The 36 conditional cooperators (playing CD) expect on average 67% cooperation rate
conditional on cooperation, and 12% cooperation rate conditional on defection,
The 9 unconditional cooperators (playing CC) expect on average 61% cooperation rate
conditional on cooperation, and 19% cooperation rate conditional on defection,
5
The 6 mismatchers (playing DC) expect on average 27% cooperation rate conditional on
cooperation, and 39% cooperation rate conditional on defection
Thus, in all but one of these eight conditional beliefs there is a false consensus eﬀect (Ross
et al., 1977, Blanco et al., 2014), that is, biased towards one’s own behavior class. The one
conditional belief, among the eight, that does not exhibit any consensus eﬀect appears among
the unconditional defectors. They expect a higher than actual cooperation rate conditional
on defection (21% instead of 16%), although they defect themselves as second-movers in the
same situation. This biased belief could instead be categorized as "optimism", in the sense of
exaggerating the likely success of one’s own behavior.5
Fourth, and finally, we examine statistically the cooperation rates expected by each of the
two main behavior classes; unconditional defectors and conditional cooperators. The beliefs of
the latter show a consensus eﬀect while the beliefs of the unconditional defectors does not. Our
results can be summarized as follows:
RESULT 1: Unconditional defectors expect a more cooperative reaction to defec-
tion than conditional cooperators do. The expected cooperation rate after defection
is negatively correlated with the subject’s own response to cooperation.6
RESULT 2: Conditional cooperators expect a significantly more cooperative re-
action to cooperation than unconditional defectors do. The expected cooperation
rate after cooperation is positively correlated with the subject’s own response to
cooperation.7
In another sequential prisoners’ dilemma experiment, Altmann et al. (2008) found that
conditional cooperation in the second-mover role was positively correlated with cooperation in
the first-mover role, an observation they found puzzling since it is inconsistent with many models
of other-regarding preferences under the hypothesis that the subjects have correct beliefs about
each other’s average behavior. Blanco et al. (2014) found evidence that the false consensus eﬀect
might account for a major part of the puzzling variation. Indeed, that observation is consistent
with our data for the beliefs elucidated from the conditional cooperators in our experiment. By
5More on this in Section 4.1.
6As for the findings, the null hypothesis that the cooperation rate anticipated by the unconditional defectors is
significantly lower or equal to that anticipated by the conditional cooperators can be rejected at 5%-level (p=0.0323
with Mann-Whitney U-test with continuity correction; p=0.0538 with Student’s t-test) and there is a significant
negative correlation of -0.2085 (Pearson’s product moment correlation coeﬃcient) between a cooperative reaction
to cooperation and the beliefs about cooperation in response to defection (p=0.0207, one-sided).
7We find a significant (at  = 001, one-sided) positive correlation of 0.4562 (Pearson’s product moment
correlation coeﬃcient). Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis that the expectations of the unconditional
defectors are higher than those of the conditional cooperators (Mann Whitney U test), all at 1% level and by a
large margin.
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contrast, the beliefs of the unconditional defectors in our data are on average not consistent with
consensus bias, as indicated by Result 1 above.
4 Other-regarding and moral preferences
We now turn to the main purpose of this study, namely, to use our data to see how well the
observed behavior can be explained by certain other-regarding and moral preference models
proposed in the literature. Moreover, once we have found the best fitting preference model
for each subject, we use the corresponding parameter estimates in section 4.7 to estimate the
strength of optimism and consensus bias in stated beliefs. This is the secondary contribution of
the paper.
When we estimate the parameters of a pre-specified preference model, all subjects are assumed
to behave as if they maximized the subjectively expected value of that parametric goal function.
We use the data we have about individual participants’ subjective beliefs about other’s choices
when calculating the expected values. We consider five parametric (partly nested) families of
goal functions, thus covering pure self-interest, inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), a
conditional concern for eﬃciency (Charness and Rabin, 2002), (unconditional) altruism (Becker
et al., 1974), and Homo moralis (Alger and Weibull, 2013). For each model, we seek the
parameter values that maximize the number of observations that are consistent with the model.
In that task, we assume that (a) subjects do not make mistakes in the second-mover role (that
is, they act in accordance with the hypothesized goal function), (b) subjective beliefs have been
reported truthfully, (c) all individuals within each behavior class have the same parameter values
in the hypothesized goal function (though we use their individually stated beliefs, which thus
varies across individuals in the same behavior class), (d) they choose according to their predicted
motivational goals in the first-mover role, (e) and they are risk-neutral.
In the sequential prisoners’ dilemma in Figure 1, let 1 = {} be the pure-strategy set
of player role 1 (first mover), and 2 = {} the pure-strategy set of player role
2 (second mover). Let  ( −) be the monetary payoﬀ earned by a subject in player role
 = 1 2 when using pure strategy  ∈  against an opponent who uses strategy − ∈ −
(where − denotes player role  6= ). For any goal function  that may guide the choices of a
subject, the associated behavior is thus the solution(s) to the program
max∈
X
−∈−
(−) ·  ( −) 
where (−) is the subject’s belief, at the moment of decision-making, that the opponent will
choose strategy − ∈ −. When a subject is in player role 1, we set the probability (−)
according to his or her elicited beliefs. By contrast, when in player role 2, the subject will know,
at the time of his or her decision, what choice the opponent (the first mover) has made, and
hence we assign unit probability to that observed choice.
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4.1 Homo economicus
As our bench-mark goal function we take self-interest, that is, the goal function is then simply
 for each player role  = 1 2. This goal function evidently dictates unconditional defection in
player role 2. In player role 1, it is optimal to cooperate if
30 · ˆ(|) + 5 · ˆ(|) ≥ 50 · ˆ(|) + 10 · ˆ(|) (1)
where ˆ(−|) is the subject’s (elicited) expectation about the second mover’s choice − if the
subject chooses . As indicated by (1), one can pin down the subjective expectations about
second-mover cooperation rates that sustain cooperation in player role 1. Using ˆ(|) =
1− ˆ(|) and ˆ(|) = 1− ˆ(|), we can rewrite (1) as
ˆ(|) ≥ 1
5
+
8
5
· ˆ(|) (2)
Figure 2, below, illustrates this. Each point in each of the two panes represents the beliefs of
a single unconditional defector. In the pane to the left, we have the beliefs of the unconditional
defectors who defect as a first move. In the right pane, we have the beliefs of the unconditional
defectors who cooperate as a first move. On the vertical axis we have the participant’s belief
about the cooperation rate conditional on cooperation (subjective estimate of the percentage of
participants who react cooperatively to first-mover cooperation). On the horizontal axis we have
the participant’s belief about the cooperation rate conditional on defection. The size of each dot
is proportional to the number of observations having the particular combination of beliefs. With
beliefs above the upward-sloping straight line in each pane, first-mover cooperation is optimal
for a Homo economicus That is, with beliefs in the shaded areas, a Homo economicus as first
mover behaves optimally, given his or her beliefs, while subjects with beliefs in the white areas
behave inconsistently with the Homo economicus model.
Figure 2: Unconditional defectors. The explanatory power of the Homo economicus model.
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The hollow square (at the same location in both panes) represents the average cooperation
rate in the entire population, after defection (horizontally) and cooperation (vertically). (Both
rates are expressed as shares and can thus be represented in the same manner as beliefs about
cooperation.) The two hollow triangles represent average beliefs in each pane. Thus, the relative
location of each panel’s hollow triangle, with respect to the hollow square, reflects the direction of
the bias in subjective beliefs (see section 3). The figure shows that the distribution of individual
beliefs is fairly similar in both (unconditional defector) panes. Hence, beliefs are not strongly
correlated with choices in the first-mover role. One also sees that in the left pane there are
many observations above the upward-sloping straight line (the white area in the left pane).
These are the subjects who, if self-interested and risk-neutral, should cooperate but in fact do
not. Similarly, in the right pane, there are many observations below the line - these are the
subjects who, if self-interested and risk-neutral, should defect but do not (the white area in the
right pane). Thus the darker area in each pane corresponds to the area where the observations
are in line with the self-interest model and first-movers best-respond to their reported beliefs.
In sum, this goal function explains the behavior of 27 out of 96 subjects, that is, a "hit rate"
of about 28%. All other goal functions nest Homo economicus and add parameters. Hence they
will do at least as well. The question is by how much.
4.2 Inequity aversion
An inequity averse decision-maker with preferences according to the model in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) has the following goal function:
 () ( −) =
( ( −)−  · [(− )− ( −)] if ( −) ≤ (− )
( −)−  · [( −)− (− )] if ( −)  (− ) (3)
for  = 1 2, where  and  are nonnegative and  ≥ . In other words, individuals (weakly)
dislike inequity, and (weakly) more so when they are worse oﬀ than the other party.
In the second player role, a decision-maker with such a goal function prefers to cooperate
conditional on cooperation (i.e., use pure strategy CC or CD) if
30 ≥ 50− (50− 5) (4)
or equivalently, if  ≥ 49. Likewise, the decision-maker prefers to defect conditional on defection
(i.e. use pure strategy CD or DD) if
10 ≥ 5− (50− 5) (5)
By hypothesis  ≥ 0, so all second-movers with goal function  ()2 should defect in response
to first-mover defection. Thus, when imposing the structural Fehr-Schmidt model, conditional
cooperation as second mover is equivalent with  ≥ 49.
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According to  ()1 , a first mover cooperates if
30 · ˆ(|) + [5− (50− 5)] · ˆ(|) ≥ [50− (50− 5)] · ˆ(|) + 10 · ˆ(|) (6)
where ˆ(−|) is the subject’s elicited expectation about the second mover’s choice − if the
subject chooses . Hence, an inequity averse first mover chooses C only if the second mover is
expected to be much more likely to cooperate after C than after D. In fact a closer look at (6)
reveals that, with correct beliefs about second mover behavior, Homo economicus is predicted
to have a stronger tendency to cooperate as a first-mover than an inequity averse type. This
is precisely the puzzle that was pointed out by Altmann et al. (2008) and further studied by
Blanco et al. (2014).
Figure 3: Conditional cooperators. The explanatory power of the inequity aversion model.
In what follows, we estimate best-fitting inequity-aversion parameters. In the estimations,
we assume that all subjects with a given action profile (1 2) ∈ {} × {}
have common preference parameter estimates, but the estimates may diﬀer for two subjects with
diﬀerent action profiles. Moreover, we impose the theoretical restriction in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) that  ≥  ≥ 0 so that each agent is more averse to disadvantageous inequality than to
advantageous inequality.
At first, let us consider the choices of the participants who as second movers act as conditional
cooperators (match their action with that of the first mover). There are 36 such participants
in our experiment. Recall that these are participants whose choices cannot be explained by the
self-interest model of the previous subsection. In Figure 3, such participants’ beliefs regarding
others’ cooperation in the second mover role are depicted in the same manner as the beliefs of
the unconditional defectors in the previous subsection.
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Let us apply the same approach as we did for the Homo economicus model. We can write
the condition for the optimality of first-mover cooperation, (6), in terms of the beliefs about
second-mover cooperation as
ˆ(|) ≥ 5 + 45
25 + 45 +
40− 45
25 + 45 · ˆ(|) (7)
Points in the closed half-plane defined by (7) are consistent with first mover cooperation. The
points in the opposite closed half-plane are consistent with first-mover defection. By adjusting
the parameters  and , we can influence the goodness of fit of the inequity aversion model.
In general, a higher  lowers the slope of the line that separates these half-planes. Therefore a
higher  increases the range of beliefs that are consistent with first-mover cooperation. A higher
 shifts the intercept upwards and turns the slope flatter. Thus the eﬀect of  is ambiguous.
Clearly and as shown above, if we impose  ≥ 49 = , then all the second-move choices
of the conditional cooperators are consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model. What about the
first-mover choices? It is easy to check that when  = 49 = , then the intercept of the black
line in Figure 3 lies at 59 (56%) and the slope is 4/9. Since all the three dots in the left pane
lie below this line (see Figure 3), all the defective first-mover choices by conditional cooperators
(3 observations out of 3) are consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model parameters  = 49 = .
On the other hand, 18 of the 33 observations in the right-hand pane of figure are consistent with
these parameter values of the Fehr-Schmidt model (see Figure 3).
Since setting a lower value of  or  than 4/9 would imply that the second-mover choices
of all the 36 conditional cooperators would become inconsistent with the model, we cannot
improve the fit of the Fehr-Schmidt model by lowering either of the parameters. The question
that remains is whether a higher value of  or  would allow increasing the fit of the model.
If we start out from  = 49 = , increasing  alone is ruled out by the restriction that
 ≥ . Then again increasing  raises the intercept and lowers the slope in the right-hand-side
of (7). Thus, a higher  can allow for explaining more observations in the right pane of Figure
3, if its negative eﬀect on the slope is suﬃciently strong w.r.t. to the positive eﬀect on the
intercept. But notice that a higher  also has a negative impact on the slope without aﬀecting
the intercept. Thus, we should in every case raise  to its maximal level where  =  in order
to maximize the explanatory power. Among such parameter values (requiring  =  ≥ 49), we
find that  =  = 89 has the highest explanatory power for the conditional cooperators who
also cooperate as the first move. With these parameter values, 21 out of 36 first-mover choices
of the conditional cooperators can be explained (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Conditional cooperators. The explanatory power of the Inequity aversion model.
Let us next consider the unconditional defectors. According to (4), these reveal themselves
having   49 (when inequity aversion is used as an identifying assumption). The second mover
choices do not constrain  by any means. It turns out that all of the observations in the left
pane of Figure 2 can be explained if we impose  = 4 (the maximal estimate in Fehr-Schmidt,
1999) and   49 This line is depicted in the left-hand pane of Figure 5 below. To maximize
the number of observations explained in the right pane, one should set  = 0 = .
Figure 5: Unconditional defectors. The explanatory power of the Inequity aversion model.
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Let us finally briefly analyse the behavior of unconditional cooperators (who cooperate as
second-movers both in response to cooperation and in response to defection) and mismatchers
(who defect as second-movers in response to cooperation and cooperate in response to defection).
Inequity aversion cannot explain any of these choices, since both of these types cooperate in
response to defection. For this behavior to be optimal, we would need 10 ≤ 5 − (50 − 5).
This inequality is not satisfied for any feasible, i.e. non-negative, values of  and thus inequity
aversion cannot explain the behavior of these types.
In sum, this two-dimensional class of goal functions—representing inequity aversion—is con-
sistent with the behavior of 58 out of the 96 subjects’ behavior, a “hit rate”of about 60%. The
model can explain the behavior of all the 32 unconditional defectors who defect as the first
move. The best-fitting parameter estimates for this behavioral profile are  = 4 and  = 0. The
model also explains the behavior 5 of the 13 unconditional defectors who cooperate as the first
move (estimated parameters for this profile are  = 0 = ), the behavior of all the 3 conditional
cooperators who defect as the first move (estimated parameters:  =  = 49), and the behavior
of 18 of the 33 conditional cooperators who cooperate as a first move (estimated parameters:
 =  = 89). Since cooperation in response to first-mover defection is inconsistent with this
model, the behavior of unconditional cooperators and mismatchers cannot be explained by the
model.
4.3 Social welfare
Suppose next that all individuals have a conditional concern for social eﬃciency, as expressed
by the goal function in Charness and Rabin (2002). Applied to our setting, this goal function
can be written in the form
 () ( −) =
(
(1− )( −) + (− ) if ( −) ≥ (− )
(1− )( −) + (− ) if ( −)  (− ) (8)
for  = 1 2 (and  6= ) where  and  are non-negative parameters parameters  ≤   12.
This goal function expresses a form of conditional altruism, whereby the weight placed on the
other party’s material outcome depends on who earns more. An equivalent formulation, which
more clearly shows the conditional concern for social welfare, is
 () ( −) =
( ( −) + 0 · [( −) + (− )] if ( −) ≥ (− )
( −) + 0 · [( −) + (− )] otherwise 
where 0 =  (1− 2) and 0 =  (1− 2).
It is easy to derive conditions for second mover cooperation conditional on first mover cooper-
ation and defection. These are  ≥ 49 and  ≥ 19, respectively. Thus unconditional defectors
have  ≤ 49 and  ≤ 19; conditional cooperators have  ≥ 49 and  ≤ 19; unconditional
cooperators have  ≥ 49 and  ≥ 19and mismatchers have  ≤ 49 and  ≥ 19. First-mover
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cooperation is optimal if beliefs and preference parameters satisfy:
30 · ˆ(|) + [5(1− ) + 50] · ˆ(|)
≥ [50(1− ) + 5] · ˆ(|) + 10 · ˆ(|) (9)
or equivalently
ˆ(|) ≥ 5− 45
25− 45 +
40− 45
25− 45 · ˆ(|) (10)
In the following diagrams, the straight lines indicates the combinations of beliefs about
second-mover behavior for which the first-mover is indiﬀerent between cooperation and defection
given the preference parameter values that allow to explain the highest number of observations
(under the assumption that the first-movers make no mistakes in their second-mover choices).
Figure 6: Mismatchers. The explanatory power of the Eﬃciency model.
Figure 7: Unconditional cooperators. The explanatory power of the Eﬃciency model
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Figure 8: Conditional cooperators. The explanatory power of the Eﬃciency model.
Figure 9: Unconditional defectors. The explanatory power of the Eﬃciency model.
In sum, this two-dimensional class of goal functions–representing a conditional concern for
social eﬃciency–explains the behavior of 79 of the 96 subjects, a hit rate of 82%. The model
explains the behavior of 22 of the 32 unconditional defectors who defect as a first move (the
best-fitting parameter estimates for this behavioral profile are  =  = 0), the behavior of 12
of the 13 unconditional defectors who cooperate as the first move (with  = 19 and  = 49),
the behavior of 1 of the 3 conditional cooperators who defect as a first move (with  = 0 and
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 = 49), the behavior of 32 of the 33 conditional cooperators who cooperate as the first move
(with  = 19 and  = 49), the behavior of 1 of the 2 unconditional cooperators who defect as
the first move (with  = 19 and  = 49), the behavior of 6 of the 7 unconditional cooperators
who cooperate as the first move, and the behavior of all 5 mismatchers who defect as the first
move (with  =  = 0).8
4.4 Altruism
A standard utility function used to represent (unconditional) altruism (see e.g. Becker (1976))
is
 ( −) = ( −) +  · (− ) (11)
for some  ∈ (0 1). In other words, individuals care positively about the material outcome
for the other party. Evidently, this is equivalent with a concern for welfare,  ( −) =
(1− ) · ( −) +  · [1(− ) + 2(− )]. Hence, this model is nested by the Charness
and Rabin (2002) model, obtained from (8) by requiring  = .9
A decision maker with such a utility function prefers to defect conditional on defection if
10 + 10 ≥ 5 + 50, or equivalently if  ≤ 18. Similarly an altruistic decision maker prefers to
cooperate conditional on cooperation if 30 + 30 ≥ 50 + 5, or equivalently if  ≥ 45.
An altruistic first-mover prefers to cooperate if
(30 + 30) · ˆ(|) + (5 + 50) · ˆ(|)
≥ (50 + 5) · ˆ(|) + (10 + 10) · ˆ(|)
Substituting ˆ(|) = 1− ˆ(|) and ˆ(|) = 1− ˆ(|) yields
(30 + 30) · ˆ(|) + (5 + 50) · (1− ˆ(|))
≥ (50 + 5) · ˆ(|) + (10 + 10) · (1− ˆ(|))
and thus we need
ˆ(|) ≥ 1− 8
5− 4 +
8− 
5− 4 · ˆ(|)
for first-mover cooperation by an altruist.
These predictions illustrate that for an altruist unconditional defection is consistent with
 ≤ 18, and unconditional cooperation is consistent with  ≥ 45 Mismatching by altruists is
consistent with 18 ≤  ≤ 45 Conditional cooperation is never consistent with altruism.
To understand the first-mover choices of the unconditional defectors, their altruism para-
meter must satisfy  ≤ 18 For the unconditional defectors who also defect in player role 1, the
maximum likelihood  parameter is one that induces a high intercept and slope. By choosing
8The model cannot explain the behavior of the single mismatcher who cooperates as the first move.
9Equation (8) can likewise be re-written in the form of conditional altruism.
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 = 0 the intercept equals 1/5 and the slope is 8/5, in which case 22 of the 32 observations in the
left pane of Figure 10 can be accounted for. For the unconditional defectors who cooperate as
a first move, a  inducing a small intercept and small slope coeﬃcient maximize the likelihood.
With  = 18 the intercept equals zero and the slope equals (78) · (29) = 736 so that all but
one of the observations in the right pane of Figure 10, below, can be accounted for.
Figure 10: Unconditional defectors. The explanatory power of the Altruism model.
The unconditional cooperators have  ≥ 45 All of the first-mover cooperators’ choices in
the right pane of Figure 11, below, can be explained if we choose  = 1 Yet, for unconditional
cooperators who defect as a first mover, choosing  = 45 maximizes the prospects of explaining
the observations. Yet, the implied intercept of -3 and the slope of 4 do not allow to explain
neither of the 2 observations in the left pane of Figure 11, below. For the mismatchers with
 = 18 the intercept equals zero and the slope equals (78) · (29) = 736, so that one of the
observations among the mismatchers who defect in the first-mover role can be accounted for.
There is no parameter value that allows explaining the unique mismatcher who cooperates as
the first move.
In sum, this one-dimensional class of goal functions—representing altruism—can explain the
behavior of 42 out of the 96 subjects, a hit rate of about 44%. The model explains the behavior
of 22 of the 32 unconditional cooperators who defect as the first move (parameter estimate  = 0
for this behavioral profile), the behavior of 12 of the 13 unconditional defectors who cooperate as
a first move (with  = 18), and the behavior of all 7 unconditional cooperators who cooperate
as a first move (with  = 1). The behavior of the conditional cooperators and the mismatchers
is inconsistent with the model. This class of goal functions thus comes in third. That it beats
the Homo economicus model is no surprise since it has one more parameter.
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Figure 11: Unconditional cooperators. The explanatory power of the Altruism model.
4.5 Homo moralis
Alger and Weibull (2013) define a class of utility functions, that they call Homo moralis, for
symmetric interactions. A sequential prisoners’ dilemma is asymmetric; the strategy sets and
material payoﬀs diﬀer between the two player roles. However, a subject in our experiment is
equally likely to be in the first-mover as in the second-mover role. And such an interaction is
symmetric.10 In such a setting, a behavior strategy for a subject is a triplet  = (1 2 3),
a point in the unit cube  = [0 1]3, where 1 is the probability of playing  when in the
first-mover position, 2 the probability of playing  when in the second-mover position after the
opponent has played , and 3 the probability of playing  in the second-mover position after
the opponent has played . In our experiment, we found the empirical mean-values of each of
the three local strategies  to be ¯1 ≈ 056, ¯2 ≈ 047 and ¯3 ≈ 016.
With an equal chance to be assigned the first- or second-mover position in the sequential
prisoners’ dilemma, the expected material payoﬀ,  ( ), for any subject who uses strategy
 ∈  against an opponent who uses strategy  ∈  is
 ( ) = 1
2
[(252 + 5)1 + (403 + 10) (1− 1)]
+
1
2
[(50− 202) 1 + (10− 53) (1− 1)]
=
1
2
[10 + 403 + (252 − 403 − 5)1 + (50− 202) 1 + (10− 53) (1− 1)]
10Formally, the interaction can be represented by a game tree in which "nature" makes a first move that allocate
the player roles, with probability 1/2 for each role allocation, followed by two copies of the tree in Figure 1, with
player labels reversed in one of the copies.
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The utility function of a Homo moralis with degree of morality  ∈ [0 1] is defined as
 ( ) = (1− ) ( ) +  ( ) 
Hence, up to a positive monotone transformation, we may write
 ( ) = [(252 − 403 − 5)1 − 2012 − 5 (1− 1)3] · (1− )
+ [351 + 353 + 512 − 3513] · 
Hence, if we know the subjective probabilities ˆ = (ˆ1 ˆ2 ˆ3) that a subject attaches to the
diﬀerent moves of his or her opponent, then we can calculate the best reply for Homo moralis.
It follows that cooperating as a first mover, 1 = 1, is optimal if and only if11
(8− 5ˆ2 + 8ˆ3 + 2 − 73) ≥ 1− 5ˆ2 + 8ˆ3
or
ˆ2 ≥ 1− 8 · − 2 · + 73 · 
5 · (1− ) +
8
5
ˆ3 (12)
or, in the notation used for the other goal functions,
ˆ(|) ≥ 1− 8− 2+ 73
5(1− ) +
8
5
· ˆ(|)
Likewise, cooperation in reaction to cooperation, 2 = 1, is optimal iﬀ
(4ˆ1 + 1) ≥ 4ˆ1 (13)
and cooperation in reaction to defection, 3 = 1, is optimal iﬀ
(8− 71 − ˆ1) ≥ 1− ˆ1 (14)
Unfortunately we do not have data on ˆ1, the expected initial cooperation rate.12 We analyze
the predictive power of this class of goal functions by using two alternative approaches to fill
in the missing data, and by then rating the goal function according to its explanatory power
under the approach that gives it the lowest predictive power. One approach is to assume that
the beliefs about first-mover choices is empirically correct, that is set ˆ1 = ¯1 = 05625. The
other approach is to assume a maximal consensus eﬀect, where all subjects in the same behavior
class believe that all subjects in the experiment behave like they do, in which case ˆ1 = 1. It
turns out that the correct beliefs specification is the more demanding one in this context (leads
to a slightly lower explanatory power), but for the sake of completeness, we will present both
approaches here.
11See the first order conditions in the appendix.
12The experiments were run before Homo moralis preferences were discovered.
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So let’s consider the explanatory power of this one-parameter model. We begin with the
conditional cooperators. Some of these cooperate as first movers, and others defect as first
movers. Consider, first, a conditional cooperator who cooperates as a first move. Cooperation
as second mover after cooperation is optimal iﬀ
 ≥ 4ˆ1
4ˆ1 + 1 
We do not know the conditional cooperator’s belief about 1, first movers’ cooperation rate. If
we suppose consensus beliefs, then ˆ1 = 1, and the condition states that  ≥ 45. If we plug in
 = 45 and pure-strategy behavior into (12), we get
ˆ(|) = ˆ2 ≥ −31
5
+
8
5
ˆ3 = −31
5
+
8
5
ˆ(|)
This line is below the horizontal axis in the right-hand pane of Figure 12, below, and all the
points above this line (or above the horizontal axis) are consistent with the prediction that
cooperation should be observed by the first mover. Therefore, all the points in the right-hand
pane of the figure are consistent with the Homo moralis model. This is true both for consensus
beliefs and empirically correct beliefs.
Figure 12: Conditional cooperators. The explanatory power of the Homo moralis model.
If a conditional cooperator defects as a first move and we apply consensus beliefs for ˆ1, then
condition (13) imposes no further limitations on  but from (14) we get that  ≤ 18 is required.
Subject to this restriction, the -value that maximizes the number of observations that can be
explained equals 0. We are interested in conditional cooperators who defect as a first move.
Defection is optimal if and only if (12) with the reversed inequality hold. With  = 0, this
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coincides with the first-mover defection condition of Homo economicus, i.e.
ˆ(|) = ˆ2 ≤ 1
5
+
8
5
ˆ3
and thus only one of the three observations in the left pane of Figure 12 is consistent with the
model. Assuming correct beliefs (instead of consensus beliefs), (13) requires that  ≥ 1, and
thus none of the observations in the left pane of Figure 12 can be explained.
Figure 13: Unconditional defectors. The explanatory power of the Homo moralis model.
Suppose then that the unconditional defector defects as a first move. When it comes to the
second mover choices, defection is optimal iﬀ the reverse of (13) and (14), respectively, is satisfied
while imposing 1 = 0. If we suppose consensus beliefs, then 1 = 0 = ˆ1 and the reverse of
(13) is satisfied for all parameter values. The reverse of (14) is satisfied iﬀ  ≤ 18. Again the
best fit in the left hand pane of Figure 13 is provided by  = 0 (i.e. Homo economicus) in which
case we get
ˆ(|) = ˆ2 ≤ 1
5
+
8
5
ˆ(|)
The explanatory power coincides with that of the Homo economicus model in this pane, i.e.
both with consensus and correct beliefs, 22 out of the 32 observations are consistent with the
model.
If an unconditional defector cooperates as a first move, then consensus beliefs would require
 ≤ 45. Correct beliefs would require
 ≤ 225
225 + 1 = 06923
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Moreover, the reverse of (14) must be satisfied. If we assume consensus beliefs, this restriction
does not impose any further constraints on allowable  values. If we assume correct beliefs, then
 ≤ 1−056251−05625 = 1. So again no further constraints are imposed. By picking  = 35  06923 
45, we get
ˆ(|) = ˆ2 ≥ −19
10
+
8
5
ˆ3
and thus all observations of the right-hand pane of Figure 13 are consistent with the model
(both with consensus and correct beliefs).
Figure 14: Unconditional cooperators. The explanatory power of the Homo moralis model.
Consider an unconditional cooperator who cooperates as a first move (and thus 1 = 2 =
3 = 1). If we apply consensus beliefs, then condition (14) imposes no limitations on  but
from (13) we get that  ≥ 45 is required. Again, the implied condition for the optimality of
first-mover cooperation is
ˆ(|) = ˆ2 ≥ −31
5
+
8
5
ˆ3 = −31
5
+
8
5
ˆ(|)
and all the observations in the right pane of Figure 14 can be explained.
If we apply correct beliefs to an unconditional cooperator who cooperates as a first move,
then (13) requires that
 ≥ 225
225 + 1 = 06923
and (14) requires that  = 1, leading to
ˆ2 ≥ 1− 2
5(1− ) +
8
5
ˆ3
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where the right-hand side approaches −∞ as  tends to one, so that all observations in the right
pane of Figure 14 can be explained.
Consider then an unconditional cooperator who defects as a first move. With correct beliefs,
based on the preceding argument but now with the requirement that
ˆ2 ≤ 1− 2
5(1− ) +
8
5
ˆ3
and  & 069 must hold, none of the observations in the left pane of Figure 14 can be explained.
Applying consensus beliefs, condition (13) imposes no limitations on  but from (14) we get
that  ≥ 18 is required leading to
ˆ2 ≤ 1
5
− 
5 · (1− ) +
8
5
ˆ3
and thus  = 18 provides the highest explanatory power. Indeed, the inequality above thus
reduces to
ˆ2 ≤ 6
35
+
8
5
ˆ3
and thus one of the two observations in the left pane of Figure 14 can be explained.
Finally, consider mismatchers, and start with those mismatchers who cooperate as a first
move. Applying consensus beliefs, condition (14) imposes no limitations on  but from (13) we
get that  ≤ 45 is required. The  with the greatest explanatory power equals 4/5 and again
all the observations in the right pane of Figure 15 can be explained.
Figure 15: Mismatchers. The explanatory power of the Homo moralis model.
With correct beliefs, (13) imposes
 ≤ 225
225 + 1 = 06923
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and (14) imposes  ≤ 1. Thus none of the observations can be explained.
For mismatchers who defect as a first move, the separating straight line
ˆ2 = 1
5
+
8
5
· ˆ3
is independent of . Thus the explanatory power is independent of , and all of the observations
in the left pane of Figure 15 can be explained.
In sum, this one-dimensional class of goal functions–representing Kantian morality–can ex-
plain the behavior of 80 out of the 96 subjects when missing belief data is replaced by empirically
accurate beliefs, and it can explain the behavior of 83 of the 96 subject when missing belief data
is replaced by maximal (false) consensus. All 33 conditional cooperators who cooperate as their
first move (with an estimated  = 45); 1 of the three conditional cooperators who defect as the
first-move (with an estimated  = 18); all 7 unconditional cooperators who cooperate as the
first-move (with an estimated  = 45); 1 of the two unconditional cooperators who defect as
the first-move (with an estimated  = 18); all 5 of the mismatchers who defect as the first-move
(with an estimated  = 0) ; 22 of the unconditional defectors who defect as the first move (with
an estimated  = 0) and all of the 13 unconditional defectors who cooperate as the first move
(with an estimated kappa  = 35). In the first approach the hit rate is 83% and in the second
87%. We use the lower hit rate as this model’s prediction power.
4.6 Model comparison
The explanatory power of the five models, expressed as their "hit rate", the percentage of the
subject pool whose behavior can be explained, are given in the table below.
TABLE 2
Model Hit rate
Homo moralis 0.83
Social welfare 0.82
Inequity aversion 0.60
Altruism 0.44
Homo economicus 0.28
This suggests that Homo moralis and Social welfare models are most capable of explaining
our data.13 This rough comparison should of course be taken with a grain of salt. However, it
13Notice, however, that without the inequality restrictions on  and , the Conditional eﬃciency model would
have a hit rate of 95% (91 of the 96 observations could be explained), and with an alternative specification of
the beliefs in the Homo moralis model (consensus beliefs about first-mover behavior), also that model’s hit rate
would be 87%.
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suggests that prediction scores can be obtained on the basis of experiments of the kind we have
made, and the explanatory power of alternative preference models can then be compared.
The above scores are rough, however, and they are not "fair" in that they disregard the
number of free parameters and constraints imposed on these. For instance, one of the "winners",
the Social welfare model, has the same number of parameters (two) as the Inequity aversion
model, but the latter imposes two inequality constraints on its parameters. If these constraints
and the non-negativity constraints of the Social welfare model parameters were relaxed, then
the Inequity aversion model would obtain exactly the same hit rate as the Social welfare model.
Indeed, the two models would then be mathematically identical. We also note that while the
Homo economicus model has no free parameter, the Altruism and Homo moralis models have
one each. Hence, the playing field is not "horizontal". For a "fair" comparison, the models
should be given some "handicap" depending on their numbers of free parameters. To do this in a
serious way is beyond the scope of this note. However, we conclude by making some observations
and preliminary suggestions for how this could be done.14
The current literature in econometrics suggests two "handicap rules", the BIC (the Bayesian
information criterion, Schwartz, 1978) and the AIC (the Akaike information criterion, Akaike,
1985), intended to enable comparison of the explanatory power of models with diﬀerent numbers
of parameters. Let  () be the maximum likelihood of a model  given data  (that is,
with the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model on the basis of ), let
 be the number of observations in the data set , and let  be the number of parameters in
the model. Then
 () =  · ln − 2 · ln ()
and
 () = 2 − 2 · ln () 
where a lower score represents higher explanatory power. If we use as our data set each subject’s
first-mover choice, then  = 96, and thus ln 96 ≈ 456. Consequently, the BIC will penalize
models harder for their number of free parameters than the AIC. To give an indication of the
orders of magnitude, we briefly sketch the simplest possible error specification in our five models
and calculate their AIC and BIC scores on the basis of this.
Take any one of our five preference models  and suppose that it prescribes the first-mover
choice  ∈ {}. Assume that each subject obeys this utility function with probability 1− 
and otherwise randomizes uniformly over the two choices. Assuming statistical independence
between subjects and letting  be the random variable describing the choice of subject , we
then have Pr ( =  ) = 1 − 2 for all subjects . The number of choices according to the
model  , the random variable  = 1 +  +, is binomially distributed,  ∼  ( ) for
14Not only is the error specification simplistic; we also neglect the inequality constraints imposed by some of
the models, which reduce the degree of freedom for some parameters. We are unaware of a methodology that
would account for such restrictions.
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 = 1 − 2. We consider three alternative values of : 5%, 10%, and 20% (see Tables 3-5 in
the appendix). These rough calculations (based on unrestricted maximum-likelihood estimates)
suggest the Homo moralis model as the winner. A more complete data set and a more carefully
modelled error specification is needed if the explanatory power of the models are to be seriously
compared.
4.7 Belief biases
Section 3 showed that expectations about cooperation diﬀer from actual observed cooperation
rates and that the beliefs are systematically correlated with behavior. Unconditional defect-
ors, for instance, had a significantly higher expectation about cooperation rate conditional on
defection than conditional cooperators.
In this subsection, we further analyze the observed diﬀerences in beliefs. We suggest a model
which permits that subjective beliefs may deviate from actual population behavior and that the
biases are influenced both by the consensus eﬀect and optimism. The best-fitting such model, the
one that minimizes the errors in predicting the stated beliefs about second-mover cooperation
rates shows a 33% consensus bias and 15% optimism bias in the elicited beliefs.
To illustrate the calculations, consider a first-mover’s beliefs about reactions to first-mover
cooperation. We hypothesize that 0s subjective belief about the second mover’s cooperation
rate is a combination of the actual second-mover cooperation rate, ¯2, 0s own second-mover
behavior (the consensus eﬀect), 2, and 0s optimism bias, as follows:
˜(|) = (1− ) · ¯2 +  · 2 +  · ()− ()() + () · ¯2 (15)
Here  is the weight on the consensus eﬀect, the consensus bias, and  the weight on the
optimism eﬀect, the optimism bias. In the third term on the right-hand side, () is 0s
utility if the second mover reacts cooperatively to ’s cooperation, and () is 0 utility if
the second-mover instead defects. We estimate these utilities parametrically according to the
Social welfare model.15 Note that the optimism eﬀect vanishes if () = (); then
˜(|) = (1 − )¯2 + 2. This illustrates that optimism acts through the subject’s utility
evaluations of outcomes. Since diﬀerent behavior classes in our subject pool have diﬀerent
parameter estimates, the optimism eﬀect may diﬀer between these classes.
In order to illustrate the numbers involved, let us briefly consider an unconditional defector 
(that is, an individual who always defects as second mover). If such an individual  also defects
as a first-mover, then his or her estimated -value is zero (see the left pane of Figure 9). Thus,
for such an individual we have () = 30 and () = 5, indicating a preference for
second-mover cooperation in response to cooperation. The optimism term in (15) accordingly
becomes  · 2535 · 047 ≈ 034, and since this term is positive there is a strong upward-biasing
15We use this model since it is one of the "winners" and since it is well-known. Ideally, one would like to take
the best-fitting model for each behavioral category.
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eﬀect of optimism on the predicted conditional cooperation rate. The same calculation can be
carried out for the beliefs about cooperation rates conditional upon first-mover defection. Similar
exercises for all behavioral classes yields two prediction errors, defined as absolute deviations
between subjective and objective cooperation rates, for each subject; |˜(|)− ˆ(|)| and
|˜(|)− ˆ(|)|, respectively. Minimization of the sum of prediction errors for all subjects
results in the population estimates  ≈ 033 and  ≈ 015. The consensus bias is thus about
twice as strong as the optimism bias.
5 Conclusion
We here compare the explanatory power of five established preference models and identify sub-
jects’ belief biases. We do this by way of a novel approach that is, arguably, both intuitive and
visually appealing, applied to a simple two-stage games, a sequential prisoners’ dilemma. The
five preference models are Homo economicus, altruism (Becker, 1976), inequity aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999), a concern for social welfare (Charness and Rabin, 2002), and a concern for
morality (Alger and Weibull, 2013). Using maximum likelihood techniques that use subjects’ eli-
cited beliefs about each others’ behavior, we find that a concern for social welfare and a concern
for morality share the “first prize” in this model horse-race. If account is taken for the number
of free parameters in each of the five preference models, the latter comes out as the winner. We
also find that the subjects’ average belief about each others’ average behaviors comes fairly close
to the truth. However, individual subjects diﬀer quite a lot in beliefs and their individual biases
show some correlation with their own behavior. Using maximum-likelihood methods we identify
a “false consensus” bias (Ross et al. 1977, Blanco et al. 2014), whereby subjects believe others
behave more like themselves than they actually do, and a certain degree of optimism (Weinstein,
1980, Hey, 1984), whereby subjects overestimate probabilities for favorable outcomes (as eval-
uated in terms of their estimated preferences). We find that in our subject pool the consensus
bias is about twice as strong as the optimism bias.
All five preference models are more complex than the Homo economicus model. Hence, their
explanatory power needs to be traded oﬀ against their simplicity and versatility. Yet, even the
simple sequential prisoners’ dilemma that we use exemplifies that the gains in explanatory power
by increasing the model complexity slightly may be considerable. On our experimental data,
one can raise the explanatory power by adding just one free parameter from about 28% to about
83%. The psychological realism of the five preference models appears harder to evaluate, and on
this we have no data, but arguably, each has a fairly clear intuitive and distinctive psychological
appeal. Self-interest, altruism, inequity concern, a concern for social welfare and/or morality,
all appear often in people’s stated motivations for the actions they take in life.
There are, of course, many caveats to our analysis and results. Three limitations are particu-
larly important. First, we throughout assume risk-neutrality, although recent evidence suggests
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that other-regarding preferences in the face of risk are more complicated than suggested by
simple risk-neutrality (Trautmann and Vieider, 2011, Fudenberg and Levine, 2012, Miettinen et
al. 2017). Secondly, and even more importantly, we make very strong simplifying error specific-
ations. Third, our data set is very limited in that each subject plays a single game (protocol)
only once.
In future research, it would thus be interesting to collect a more comprehensive data sets
where several games (game protocols) are played by each participant (as in Blanco et al. 2011;
Boschini et al. 2013; Dreber et al. 2014). This would allow to test the accuracy of out-of-
sample predictions based on preference parameters estimated from a sample of the observations.
Another important avenue would be to collect more data on subjective beliefs about others’
behaviors, and potentially even others’ "types", so that one can estimate various reciprocity
models and models of interdependent preferences (Levine, 1998; Charness and Rabin, 2002,
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, Weibull, 2004, Falk and Fishbacher, 2006, Cox et al. 2008,
Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008), or even models of concerns for social image or self-image (Benabou
and Tirole, 2006, Ellingsen et al. 2012; Malmendier et al. 2014).
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Appendix
A1. Homo moralis
First-order conditions for the maximization problem are
 ( )
1 = 5 (52 − 83 − 1) (1− ) + 52+ 35 (1− 3)
 ( )
2 = −201 (1− ) + 51
 ( )
3 = −5 (1− 1) (1− ) + 35 (1− 1)
A2. Model comparison
TABLE 3: 5% error.
model parameters BIC AIC
Homo economicus 0 307 307
Inequity aversion 2 119 114
Social welfare 2 34 29
Homo moralis 1 27 24
Altruism 1 206 203
TABLE 4: 10% error.
model parameters BIC AIC
Homo economicus 0 214 214
Inequity aversion 2 72 67
Social welfare 2 19 14
Homo moralis 1 13 10
Altruism 1 136 133
TABLE 5: 20% error.
model parameters BIC AIC
Homo economicus 0 125 125
Inequity aversion 2 33 28
Social welfare 2 14 9
Homo moralis 1 10 7
Altruism 1 71 68
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